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If that's the expectation then it can be set at 95% too?
I have not heard a convincing rationale as to why this would be better.
Minimizing disruption?
A 55% threshold will not cause disruption. Everyone will have plenty of time to upgrade.
You do know that just repeating this claim like a mantra doesn’t actually make it so, right?
If someone can argue coherently as to why it's wrong, I will change my mind. I have only heard incoherent FUD up until now.
Incoherent FUD like this proposed guide?
Social consensus is overwhelmingly in favor of rejecting data storage as a use case, and BIP-110 is the best way to accomplish this. If someone finds a better way, I will withdraw BIP-110. Failing that, there is absolutely no reason to oppose BIP-110.
If 2016 blocks is plenty of time to upgrade, why not just have BIP 110 activate 2016 blocks from now?
You cannot be serious.
serious as:
Social consensus is overwhelmingly in favor of rejecting data storage as a use case, and BIP-110 is the best way to accomplish this. If someone finds a better way, I will withdraw BIP-110. Failing that, there is absolutely no reason to oppose BIP-110.
My statement is serious. Yours is not.
Isn't it the case that waiting to activate until you see 95% of miners signalling reduces the likelihood of lengthy reorgs?
at 55% of miners, there are still a large chunk of miners who will be mining non-BIP-110 blocks. the 55% will have to reorg out these blocks every time they occur. This seems like it would be a pretty messy process and could go on for quite some time.
I would expect such a situation to result in very few people making any transactions at all, because confirmation becomes highly unreliable.
"at 55% of miners, there are still a large chunk of miners who will be mining non-BIP-110 blocks"
This is a very dubious claim. Why would any miner waste money like this?
Remember, all miners have 2 weeks to upgrade once lock-in occurs, before their blocks will start being orphaned by the network.
So once we have a difficulty period with at least 1109 blocks that signal for BIP 110, we have another 2016 blocks before lock-in occurs?
Does this mean that if there is a difficulty period with at least 1109 blocks signaling for BIP 110, even if the next difficulty period has less than 1109 blocks signaling for BIP 110, then people running the BIP 110 rc will start enforcing BIP 110 rules at the beginning of the next difficulty period?
So, once activated, BIP 110 rules won't be enforced on blocks until the 2017th block?
Lock-in occurs immediately once there is a two-week difficulty adjustment period with at least 1109 signaling blocks. Activation occurs two weeks after lock-in.
There will be a period of mandatory signaling two weeks before the last possible lock-in, which is two weeks before the mandatory activation height.
Does this mean that if there is a difficulty period with at least 1109 blocks signaling for BIP 110, even if the next difficulty period has less than 1109 blocks signaling for BIP 110, then people running the BIP 110 rc will start enforcing BIP 110 rules at the beginning of the next difficulty period?
Yes.
So, once activated, BIP 110 rules won't be enforced on blocks until the 2017th block?
If you mean "once locked in" rather than "once activated", then the answer is yes. "Activation" means the new rules are immediately enforced.
In this case, 55% of the hashrate would be doing the orphaning. That is "the network" by any practical definition.
Is it your opinion that this is really just in the hands of miners now?
Noderunners have nothing further to contribute to the matter?
If I run the BIP 110 rc2 will it enforce the new rules if anything less than 55% of miners are also running it?
It will activate unconditionally on ~Sep 1, 2026 if miners do not signal readiness before then.
If the 55% threshold is reached sooner, then the new rules will activate sooner.
So the plan is to either convince x% of the miners in an epoch, which is why your threshold is so low, because you know you cannot make this less controversial than it is, and if you don't get that, then an economic nodes majority will kick in and your camp will just fork off on a chaintip with whatever miners you can convince that will then stop cooperating with the majority.
I must admit, we're going to learn a lot from this.
The threshold is lower than usual mostly to prevent malicious miners from vetoing the change, which we have seen with past miner-activated softfork attempts. If 55% of the hashpower is ready to change the rules, then there is no reason to wait any longer than that.
Seems to me that if there are "malicious miners" they might be willing to try to "waste money" (as you called it in another comment) and refuse to shift over to BIP 110.
You seem to be arguing that few miners would be willing to lose money mining non-BIP 110 blocks after activation BUT also that some significant portion of miners is willing to act maliciously toward BIP 110.
Considering the amount of false signaling we saw before segwit and taproot activation, 55% signaling could easily be reached with less than a majority of the hashrate enforcing the new rules. (Assuming there were an expectation for this proposal to come anywhere close to that level of signaling.)
Do you have more data on false signaling? I presume it should be straightforward to identify miners who are doing this.
This doesn't split the network. It just means that any miners still mining blocks using the old rules will have their blocks orphaned by 55% of the hashrate. It is very unlikely that miners will take this risk.