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It seems likely that in doing so hashers would be incurring some loss of profit (at least because of switching costs, but likely also due to payout structure or pool size, as well as the increased risk that not enough hashers defect to break CensorPool's majority) and switiching is definitely not in their immediate best interest -- possibly not in their interest at all. Does Bitcoin's security model in this situation rely on nothing more than the altruistic feelings of hashers? Hoping that hashers will do "the right thing" even when it's contrary to their immediate best interest?
Nice write-up! I think hashers acting "in their immediate best interest" is maybe a fair but not entirely accurate assumption. A lot of hashers are very knowledgeable about Bitcoin and would not put immediate best-interest over the viablility of the project as a whole. Why risk killing the goose? Something like this happened when Gigahash.io got a bit over 50% years ago. The pool didn't even exist for very long after that. If hashers feel legitimately threatened they will act, imo.
A lot of hashers are very knowledgeable about Bitcoin and would not put immediate best-interest over the viablility of the project as a whole
That's the big unknown. It's curious to me that Bitcoin security relies to some extent on people being knowledgeable and farsighted.
It's kinda like assuming that Bitcoin developers are more likely to report a bug than exploit it. While we may hope this happens, sure doesn't seem like a great way to operate.
Don't we have to assume Bitcoin exists in the most adversarial environment possible?
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