In 2022, of all app store takedowns requested by government, Apple literally complied with China 1435 times, which represented 97.3% of all requests worldwide.
Apps removed from the App Store subject to government takedown demands 1474
By country or region • China mainland: 1435 • India: 14 • Pakistan: 10 • Russia: 7 • Türkiye: 2 • Bulgaria: 1 • Cyprus: 1 • Hong Kong: 1 • Italy: 1 • Latvia: 1 • Nigeria: 1
They did this to Damus for example, when it listed. It's probably one of the easiest ways China can enforce a ringfenced Internet besides adding IP addresses to the Great Firewall. One of the reasons BTC/Nostr can be resilient is plenty of non-app store options to access. Also a good reminder that app store configuration/choice is a vital part of making technologies anti-censorship resilient.
Apple publishes a breakdown that makes it apparent how much the company works with China.
https://www.apple.com/legal/more-resources/docs/2022-App-Store-Transparency-Report.pdf
In 2022, of all app store takedowns requested by government, Apple literally complied with China 1435 times, which represented 97.3% of all requests worldwide.
Apps removed from the App Store subject to
government takedown demands
1474
By country or region
• China mainland: 1435
• India: 14
• Pakistan: 10
• Russia: 7
• Türkiye: 2
• Bulgaria: 1
• Cyprus: 1
• Hong Kong: 1
• Italy: 1
• Latvia: 1
• Nigeria: 1
They did this to Damus for example, when it listed. It's probably one of the easiest ways China can enforce a ringfenced Internet besides adding IP addresses to the Great Firewall. One of the reasons BTC/Nostr can be resilient is plenty of non-app store options to access. Also a good reminder that app store configuration/choice is a vital part of making technologies anti-censorship resilient.