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Is there literature on this type of auction
There's literature on a bunch of different voting mechanisms, I'm not sure if anyone's looked at this one, specifically. I ran it past a friend who's into mechanism design and he thought it made sense, but he hadn't heard anyone talk about it before.
It's a type of all-pay auction and those have certainly been studied extensively.
I have seen people advocate for a system where you can buy as many votes as you want, but they increase in cost exponentially. I know that's been studied. Supposedly, that design has a bunch of really nice properties.
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Campaign donors would cease to exist?
Instead save your money for voting
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Exactly. There are quite a few implications like that. Maybe I'll write up a post about it tomorrow to see what other people think about it.
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Are you talking about futarchy or something similar?
When delphi.market and more territory policies are live, I might rename ~oracle to ~futarchy and then we can run our own little futarchy on SN šŸ‘€
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It is similar, but without the part where you trust politicians to "formally define and manage an after-the-fact measurement of national welfare".
What I'm talking about is just bidding on the outcomes you want. Voting is cheap talk, while this is a costly signal. If anyone can appreciate why that matters it's the SN team.
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Take all of my cheaply earned sats to confirm my biases.
Iā€™m curious about the mechanics and rules etc
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It would basically work by pledging money towards the outcomes you want to see: i.e. $1000 on Biden losing, $100 on RFK winning, etc. Whichever outcome happens, that's what you pay.
I misspoke earlier. It's not an all-pay auction. I hadn't thought about this in a while and forgot exactly how it works.
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Prediction markets?