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What if we got two bitcoins out if this?
One (bip110) that continues to attempt more restrictive and complicated soft forks that continually aim towards limiting arbitrary data in Bitcoin transactions...
But this line of reasoning answers itself doesn't it? Who wants to sign up to a Bitcoin that is predicated on frequent contentious soft forks without end?
(If they aren't contentious, who is doing the deciding about how best next to limit transactions to expunge the scourge of spam?)
@dathon_ohm pointed out the repeated requirement of new soft forks. Do you really believe the economic weight of Bitcoin users want to embark on this path?
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What isn't being considered here is that it isn't miners who ultimately choose blocks. it is the economic nodes.
Sure -- miners can choose what transactions go in their block.
But in a split, what happens is that nobody wants to taint their coins with coins mined after the fork. They can still spend pre-fork coins, but the change from each side that they get back is then tainted (i.e., spendable only on that one side in which the transaction was mined).
To avoid this result, they simply don't spend.
What happens after that used to be game theory, but then the BCash nonsense nearly a decade ago showed us exactly what will happen. Instead of one winning side and one losing side, you have two losing sides (at least, temporarily until things shake out), and ultimately a bitcoin emerges (likely the bip-110 side) as does a shitcoin (likely the core 30 side). And also the result is a bunch of miners, merchants and traders who lost funds from having to take a side and took the wrong side (including those who took no side, but by default their client or service followed the protocol and ended up choosing a side for them, and left them in a position they wouldn't have had been in, had they chosen in advance).
What ultimately resolves this is the economic nodes. They will not spend anything needlessly, but when they do spend, they will split their coins and spend on the chain they don't wish to support (Gresham's law). That flooding of those coins on the market results in the hash price on one side to be less than the hash price on the other side. As long as the miners can still dump their mined coins after 100 blocks (let's say even on the lesser-hashrate side it will take three or so days, they will choose the chain that gives them the higher hash price.
It gets very messy when there is not near universal consensus. But we've been through this before, and (most of us) will get through it if it were to happen again.