I like to tell people that I became a bitcoiner in 2003, even though the network launched in 2009, and I didn't get into it until 2020. Mostly I say this because bitcoin offers an alternative to people who have been, and are still being colonized by the IMF (and by extension, those that live in the West). This is what I studied in my collegiate years. It was dark and no one thought there was a viable solution. I graduated in 2003. Most of my classmates became lawyers. I worked at a bank for one year before hitting the road to play trombone. I envisioned no way to be a part of the solution. Bitcoin fixes this, albeit slowly.

The other day, I found this old paper I wrote for a class that didn't have anything to do with macro-economics in the Global South. Since the Bitcoin protocol essentially is an immutable constitution, I figured this is an apropos piece to look back upon. Here we have another problem I saw in the world that might have a better solution. It seems to have arrived, at least concerning monetary policy. Despite the juvenile writing style, I think the primary idea of this essay stands up! What say you?

Jason ---REDACTED---
Political Science H596
Craig Volden
December 9, 2003

Constitutional FederalismConstitutional Federalism

In his book, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*, William H. Riker contends that a federal system of government will be most successful if it serves the purpose of military or political security (Riker). With this utility, otherwise less powerful political units have the opportunity to enjoy greater safety from external threats without compromising their individual sovereignty. However, he does not discuss in great detail what this implies for the individual rights of citizens living within these areas. Federalism's implications on rights are especially significant due to the “federalist revolution” of the last fifty years. From the end of the second world war until today, many of the world’s largest and most politically significant countries have adopted federal systems (Katz). This has prompted much debate by other political thinkers over the years concerning the issue. Before knowing about the future expansion of federalist systems, James Madison states in Federalist Paper 51 that, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” (Madison). His implication is that government serves the purpose of protecting human rights and that every possible opportunity one can create at any given level of government should be implemented in insuring this end. Madison’s view, however, seems to loose credibility with observations of southern American states’ appeals to federalism for autonomy in implementing slavery and infractions on human rights and countries such as Nigeria, where states discriminate against non-indigenous peoples. One consistent presence in insuring that a federal system guarantees individual rights more than anything else is that of a constitution. Madison was one of the largest advocates for a bill of rights which ultimately limits both national and state power in a number of ways. Such an idea gives the government an opportunity to affirm, rather than limit, rights at as many levels of government as exist. Therefore, it can be seen through analysis of present federal systems that the presence of a Constitution ensuring that every level of government will do what is necessary to protect its citizens’ rights is necessary in the creation of a successful federal government.

In such an analysis, Madison would make a logical starting place due to his innovative thinking concerning the creation of a government focused on implementing the new liberal principles developed by thinkers like John Locke and John Stuart Mill. In Federalist Paper 39, he discusses the importance of avoiding the development of a unitary government. Such a government doesn’t allow for the cultural and value diversities of the smaller communities within it. Entire groups of people, even if they are geographically centralized are forced to succumb to the will of people entirely unattached from their lifestyle. Likewise, developing a number of small, independent states creates, ironically the same problems for individuals who may have been in the majority under a unitary system. By simply creating both types of government, all that has been developed is a conflict of interests. However, by creating a Constitution ensuring a set of universal rights, Madison argues, minority groups are protected by their state governments interpretation of the Constitution and majority members living in minority states are protected by the national government (Madison). This creates a system that still allows for the necessary government services including developmental and redistributive programs at whatever level the people deem necessary while limiting the government’s control on people’s personal lives in every way possible.

This principle has given the United States the opportunity to end civil rights abuses and develop new laws to protect civil rights in the future. During Madison’s time, most of the policy makers thought that the states would be the primary defenders of these rights and that the national government would more likely be the perpetrator. The civil war was a clear indicator to most of the country that the opposite is true more often than not and that such predictions are futile. However, with the development of the fourteenth amendment, neither level of government is afforded an opportunity to behave improperly (Brennan). This is not to say that either level of government is forced to behave in any specific manner concerning its developmental projects or other activities. The constitution doesn’t have any barring on the potential policies the government might develop that either help develop or produce equality for the nation. The rights of its citizens, however, are protected by this universal national law.

A logical problem one might have with this idea is that the federal Constitution might ignore a specific individual right and one might not live in a state where he or she is the majority and such a right is protected. In such a situation, however, individuals are afforded the opportunity to relocate to an area that does protect this right that he or she values. In this respect, one’s rights change as one moves from one part of the nation to the next. This makes for a balance between the universal Constitution, guaranteeing inalienable rights and the federal system, that allows each state to grant more rights than those universally reserved. Ellis Katz and Alan Tarr discuss this situation in terms of the United States Constitution and its granting of “privileges” and “immunities” of citizens. The Constitution gives the citizens immunities from certain violations while the federal system allows for privileges to be granted by the states (Katz). Constitutional federalism grants the opportunity to develop more rights by limiting government control as much as possible, not the other way around.

Further evidencing this balance, it can be seen that most of the largest strides made towards the protection of rights in the twentieth century have been made in the United States Supreme Court’s defense of the constitution. While states sometimes were aggressive in assuring the previously mentioned “privileges,” most of the necessary insurances of protection under the fourteenth amendment were affirmed in national courts. This trend was most prevalent in the 1960s concerning a number of issues including most notably search and seizure laws and civil rights issues (Katz). Without this court, states clearly would have had the power to limit the rights of minority groups within their borders.

This doesn’t necessarily imply that states don’t also protect rights in some instances. An added bonus might be when state constitutions take the initiative to allow their citizens more freedoms than the federal government allows them. This was certainly a trend for a short while in the 1970s and could easily be again. Also, states are afforded the opportunity to act as laboratories for specific laws such as Iowa’s adoption of the exclusionary rule long before the rest of the country (Katz). A number of other such instances suggest that states can help alert the federal government to problems unintentionally by making bad policy. The infringements made are, naturally, short term in the scheme of history and lead to the long term development and evolution of the national standard for individual rights protections (Osborne). Ultimately, this leads one to believe that states only have the opportunity to pave the way for the innovative granting of rights if they are given the opportunity but bound from infringing on what the entire country considers unalienable.

So far, much attention has been paid to the United States and the history of its system, considering its size, demographic, and political evolution. This system, therefore, might not seem the most fitting for another modern, developing country. However, if one analyzes the infringements of rights done by territories in Nigeria, the problems discussed seem to be caused by a lack of federal intervention in protecting individual rights. Because of, or possibly one of the causes of, bad interstate relations in Nigeria, “non-indigenes” are largely discriminated against by state governments. The term non-indigene describes individuals who weren’t born in a particular state despite how long they have lived their, whether or not they pay taxes to the state they reside in, or whether they belong to the same ethic group as the bulk of the population (Osaghae). These kind of problems are not as significant or relevant in the United States, but, as shall be seen, could be handled in a similar manner.

Unfortunately, in this case, as in a number of the countries relevant in understanding the potential of federalism, the discrimination present in Nigeria has deep historical roots. As is also the case in a number of these other countries, a great deal of this tension is the result of the inequality present in the nation and the resentment of the Northern poorer region of the more developed areas. As a result, the same problems exist for individuals from the northern region trying to establish a life in a southern state. This problem is evidenced strongly in the education system, particularly at the University level. Many non-indigenes are not admitted or forced to pay appreciably higher tuitions for school than natives (Osaghae). Clearly, the failures in this situation are not that of federalism, but a lack of federal intervention in matters of inequity and infringement of personal rights. The alternative of separate nations would greatly weaken all of them and leave the poorer northern regions in more despair. The alternative of total state control would simply perpetuate and fuel the oppression of the smaller groups. The only feasible alternative is a strong, enforceable national constitution allowing for as many freedoms by as many levels of government as possible.

The situation in Latin America is another good example because it is unique in its history, but comparable to what has been discussed thus far in its solutions. Many of the Latin American countries with significant political hardships, such as Mexico, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and so on, are the victims of harsh dictatorships resulting in minimized civil liberties and painful economic failures. This history makes it difficult to predict specifically what policies make the most sense, but one can estimate more broadly given the consistency of other regions‘ responses. As these nations develop democracies and consider the idea of federalism, it is important to consider the different regional values and desires. By developing a constitution that limits the power of a large national government, but allows for its existence, the different regions of a country can capitalize on the strength of the national government in international trading and redistribution while maintaining the right to set wage or working condition laws as high or low as necessary to accommodate the level of development that their area is currently experiencing. This allows specific territories to set the pace that is most appropriate for their current condition. As the country advances as a whole economically and in the area of human rights, the national government can set higher standards for such conditions that protect citizens from unfair working or living conditions.

As a whole, federalism is a complicated system with a number of opportunities to infringe upon the rights of its citizens. However, this entire structure is reversed when a strong constitution guaranteeing citizens rights is brought into the picture. In this situation, all of the opportunities for a government to infringe upon rights at any number of levels are now an opportunity for that level of government to interpret the freedoms granted in the constitution and interpret what they grant specifically. Naturally, this is a very important factor to consider noting the massive expansion of federalist systems previously discussed and the constant liberation and institution of democracy in Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia. Many of the countries in these areas have large, geographically centralized ethnic groups with large potential for oppression of each other and a strong central government will only be able to control each region if it grants its citizens certain immunities while allowing the individual territories the opportunity to make its own policies concerning less-priority rights and policies. Therefore, it can be seen that federal systems are a feasible alternative for these changing governments if they are insured with strong, national constitutions.

Works CitedWorks Cited

Brennan, William J. 1986. The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights. *New York University Law Review*, 61: 535-553

Dahl, Robert. 1983. Federalism and the Democratic Process. Nomos, XXV: 95-108

Escobar-Lemmon. 2001. Fiscal Decentralization and Federalism in Latin America. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 31 (4): 23-41

Katz, Ellis, G. Alan Tarr, eds. 1996. Introduction. *Federalism and Rights*. Rowman and Littlefield: ix-xvi.

Osaghae, Osaghae E. 1994. Interstate Relations in Nigeria. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 24 (4): 83-98.

Riker, William H. 1964. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Little Brown: 1-48