Back when Satoshi Dice was paying out on zeroconf (2012), and again when some Bitcoin ATMs dispensed cash on zeroconf (2019) there was the expectation that there would be miners that would exploit the obvious risk that existed with zeroconf implementations. And indeed both of those ended with losses being taken due to their reliance on zeroconf.

About the only reason it didn't happen on day one is it took a while for some miners to realize there was the opportunity to profit from doing this, and weighed the reward was risk (being ID'd and labeled as a bad actor) versus the reward and eventually deeming the reward to be sufficient relative to the risk.

So miners have the opportunity to profit by exploiting zeroconf but I do not. It's not that I want to profit from this vulnerability, it's that zerconf is a flawed approach, and that flaw should be fully exposed as a flaw, which can be done by making it so that Core v24.0 and later will simply relay replacement transactions regardless of RBF signaling.