Interesting piece, worth a read. Even if the format is quite unusual.
Interesting comments on HN, too.
The talk says that, in the 1990s, "cryptosystems were still classified as munitions and subject to strict export controls". The talk describes the "crypto wars" as "a series of legal battles, campaigns, and policy debates that played out in the US across the 1990s", resulting in "the liberalization of strong encryption in 1999", allowing people to "develop and use strong encryption without being subject to controls".
OK, that sounds familiar. Which parts are the "sins"?
Answer: the talk claims that "the legacy of the crypto wars was to trade privacy for encryption—and to usher in an age of mass corporate surveillance".
Wow. That sounds bad, and surprising, definitely something worth understanding better. If cryptographic export controls had instead remained in place after 1999, how would that have improved privacy and reduced corporate surveillance?
Answer: the talk claims that, without strong cryptography, "the metastatic growth of SSL-protected commerce and RSA-protected corporate databases would not have been possible".
[...]
- The future I hope you're troubled by mass surveillance. I hope you have the time and energy to do something about it. I know many of my readers are doing this already.
Doing something doesn't mean magically solving the whole problem all at once. It means picking a specific task where you can reasonably hope to make progress, and working on that.
For example, maybe you engage in the policy fight against surveillance mandates. Or maybe you expose the money flow behind those mandates. Or, as a programming example, maybe you work on tools for decentralization. There's much more to do.