If there are only B and D left, B would propose 100-0 and win with his half of the votes. So, if D wants to get more than 0, he will want to avoid that scenario.
Hence, if Q, B, and D are left, Q would propose 99-0-1 to win with D on his side. B wants to avoid this scenario.
If F, Q, B, and D are left, F would propose 99-0-1-0 to win with B on his side. Q and D want to avoid this scenario.
So, C will propose 98-0-1-0-1 and win with Q and D on his side.
If I were C, I wouldn't risk my life on the assumption that all agents are perfectly rational, and propose something that doesn't infuriate the others.
Indeed, and fairness can be rationalized game theoretically if there are repeated interactions, something we assumed away in this simple setup
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We do know, with pretty high certainty, from experimental econ that the pirates would throw the captain overboard for making that offer.
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