From the perspective of Western states, the history of international politics has been a long series of questions. One was the “Balkan Question,” which since the early 20th century has referred to how and by what means a permanent peace can be ensured in that region. Another and related question that consumed the 20th century was the “German Question,” or how to ensure the security of Europe with a unified Germany at its center. Another is the “Palestinian Question,” which is shorthand for finding a formula that will enable the Palestinian people to have their own nation-state alongside the Jewish state of Israel.

But there is another question that has been just as vexing to Western foreign policymakers: the Russian Question.

The question of whether the West and Russia can peacefully co-exist is quite relevant today, and for many observers, the answer is a decidedly firm, “No.” The ongoing war in Ukraine has laid bare the frictions between the two camps, while confirming that Russia is not interested in being a full participant in the Western-led international order, be it “rules-based” or otherwise.

If one takes a longer view, it becomes clear that if there has been one constant in international politics over the past 200 years and more, it is that Western states have perceived Russia as an outsider and a threat, while Russia has viewed the West as seeking to thwart its standing on the global stage and at times even posing an existential risk. It is a classic instance of how perception and misperception can feed conflict.

Since rising to the ranks of Great Powers in the early 19th century, Russia has long been portrayed in the West as the antagonistic “heavy” of international politics, the state against which Western global interests were opposed. In the 19th century, Britain engaged in the “Great Game” against Russia in Central Asia. In the early 20th century, Germany sought to counter Russian domination of Eastern Europe. In the second half of the 20th century, the United States led the Western coalition that engaged in the Cold War with Soviet Russia.

For the brief period after the fall of the Soviet Union, when Russia was no longer perceived as a threat to Western interests, pundits revealingly declared that the end of the Cold War had in fact ushered in the end of history. But with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, tensions between Russia and the West—and with them the Russian Question—returned with a vengeance.

What is the answer to the Russian Question, besides simply demanding that Russia under President Vladimir Putin “stop” violating international law and invading neighbors? Is it possible for Russia and the West not just to reluctantly co-exist, but to establish what the esteemed political scientist and conflict scholar Johan Galtung called a “positive peace,” meaning one built on trust and even mutual respect, with the possibility of violent conflict no longer even a consideration? Stated differently, is it possible for the relationship between the West and Russia to resemble that between the U.S. and Canada or even the “special relationship” between the U.S. and Great Britain?

The latter example is instructive. While the two nations have a special relationship today, that was not always the case. In the period following U.S. independence in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the U.S. and Britain fought two major wars. Throughout the 19th century, they continued to distrust one another. When the U.S. Civil War broke out in 1861, the administration of then-President Abraham Lincoln feared that the British would try to exploit the situation to permanently weaken the nation by recognizing the Southern Confederacy. Even during the early 20th century, the U.S. and Britain continued to view one another warily as staunch naval rivals.

But the relationship eventually changed. The U.S. fought on the side of the British in World War I and then again in WW II. It was during the latter war that the “special relationship” was forged by Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. But this was largely because the British finally recognized that they were no longer a peer competitor to the U.S. and accepted being the junior partner in the relationship. So while the current bilateral relationship is special, it is not a partnership of equals, whether real or perceived.

If we use the U.S.-British relationship as a template, then the lesson is that for Russia and the U.S., or the West more generally, developing a positive peace, even one that falls short of a special relationship, will likely require that it not be a relationship of equals. One side will need to accept that it is the junior partner to the other. That has never seemed likely, and it is especially unlikely now.

If anything, Russia has become so antagonistic to the U.S. that it is even willing to accept the junior partner role in its relationship with China. And since the U.S. and the West distrust the ultimate global ambitions of China, suspecting it of seeking, like Russia, to overturn the order the West has dominated for the past two centuries, it is unlikely that Russia drawing closer to China will facilitate the establishment of a positive peace with the West.

Some would argue that this overstates the fundamental nature of the tensions between the U.S. and Russia. Specifically, they consider the current tensions with Russia to be just a “Putin Problem” rather than a “Russia Problem.” After all, during the 1990s, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton and his Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, appeared to have forged a genuine friendship that helped solidify the bonds between the two erstwhile enemies. According to this argument, the current tensions between Russia and the West are driven solely by Putin. But far from being an outlier, Putin is simply the latest Russian leader to embody the country’s historical self-image as the perpetual outsider.

As for those in the West holding out hope for another reformist figure like Mikhail Gorbachev, it’s important to remember that Gorbachev himself was more an accidental reformer. He did not want or set out to end communism in the Soviet Union, let alone cause the collapse of the entire USSR. Instead, he sought to tweak the Soviet system to make it more sustainable, while pulling back from the peripheral commitments that were sapping it. In some respects, he set out to achieve what China has accomplished today: create a system with Marxist-Leninist principles at its core, but reinvigorated by capitalist incentives to overcome its economic and political challenges.

Of course, all of this discussion only touches on the core issue presently dividing Russia and the West: Ukraine. Going back to its invasion of Georgia, Russia has a nearly two-decade track record of military aggression against neighbors seeking Western alignment. The current war in Ukraine is unlikely to end soon. But even when the hot war ends, a Cold War-like tension between Ukraine and Russia and, by extension, between the West and Russia is likely to continue. The Russian Question is likely to remain an open one.