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People don't want to change miner incentives. PS positions BIP300 toying with miner incentives, and giving miners more power, as a virtue, but this is the problem most people have with BIP300 afaict. BIP300 can only kill other L2s if it's running and it isn't.
Things like BIP300 are cool but they'll only be run when other L2s have actually failed (and are not just declared dead by anyone who wants the attention of us low IQ, greg-dick-sucking, ln-vc-marketers) and we have no choice but to deliberately change miner incentives, no matter how many curses PS thinks he puts on other L2s.
Things like BIP300 are cool but they'll only be run when other L2s have actually failed
I'm not enough of an insider to opine on specifics, but my vague take is that btc is dominated by two extrema:
a) circlejerking maxis shouting as loud as they can that everything is fine and will always be fine, and any suggestion that something could be a serious problem (e.g., dwindling block reward) is met w/ accusations of shitcoinery and even less coherent replies because btc is inevitable
b) doomsayers who never shut up about how obviously nothing can ever work, and any argument that it's working now is a delusion
Both camps are tedious to me, but I dislike the first camp more, because the second camp is trivially refutable, and thus harmless. The first camp could be an existential risk. I appreciate PS for offering concrete diagnoses and proposals.
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109 sats \ 2 replies \ @k00b 3 May
I don't mind PS either. We need orthoganites. He just beats his own drum a little too much, insisting it produces The True Music and everyone else is hearing impaired.
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orthoganites
Did you just make this up? I like it.
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27 sats \ 0 replies \ @k00b 3 May
Yes lol. It felt like I met a language pothole.
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108 sats \ 0 replies \ @k00b 3 May
Underneath PS's megalomania there is an interesting hypothesis though. He just overextends it.
It's premised on L2s needing to settle onchain and miners needing incentivizes to mine those transactions. He suggests if miners benefit more from another L2, they won't mine a competing L2's txs. And, surprise, drivechains are such a miner-biased L2.
This assumes:
  1. miners can distinguish between an L2 tx and ordinary tx
  2. the network has no recourse when miners act a fool
  3. drivechains are activated
The interesting bit here is that L2s could have such significant dependency on miners that it requires a disproportionate "bribe" be paid to miners. I'm not sure that's true, but it could be.
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