Your docs say:
The Maker generates...[a] collateral invoice, secured by a hash from a trusted third party...the trusted third party does not have access to the [trade] funds but [only] to the preimage [to the collateral invoice]...The Taker...[must pay]...the collateral invoice...[which is paid out to the Maker] if the trade is not [finished] in 5 seconds
That is not trustless. The Taker must trust the third party not to collude with the Maker to steal the collateral.
Creating an exchange on lightning is cool but you do it a disservice when you call it trustless even though the oracle + the Maker can steal the Taker's money. I recommend removing the term trustless from your marketing, and be clear that each trade does involve trust, and always favors the Maker.
Creating an exchange on lightning is cool but you do it a disservice when you call it trustless even though the oracle + the maker can steal the taker's money. I recommend removing the term trustless from your marketing.
There are reputational factors to this 100%, but it's the same as saying Lightning is trustless when you have peers you have to route through -- same principle imo. Oracle has 0 incentive to steal the collateral, which at most is a couple bps.
That being said I completely understand your point. Will revisit wording!
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it's the same as saying Lightning is trustless when you have peers you have to route through
Your counterparty on flashnet can collude with flashnet to steal your money if you are a Taker. Your lightning peers can't do that. They could collude with miners to execute a 51% attack on bitcoin, censor your justice transactions, and steal from you that way. But that's a lot harder than phoning up flashnet and saying "hey, let's rug this guy." I appreciate the comparison, but flashnet introduces a lot bigger of a trust assumption than lightning does.
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Your counterparty on flashnet can collude with flashnet to steal your money if you are a Taker. Your lightning peers can't do that. They could collude with miners to execute a 51% attack on bitcoin, censor your justice transactions, and steal from you that way. But that's a lot harder than phoning up flashnet and saying "hey, let's rug this guy." I appreciate the comparison, but flashnet introduces a lot bigger of a trust assumption than lightning does.
What I meant was that there are trust-assumptions on Lightning as well, but we still call it trustless. I agree that the attack vector may be bigger here, but incentives are not aligned. But, again, yes will revisit wording!
Also, this is just v1! Lots of room for improvement as always :)
If you want to keep chatting more than happy to @ t.me/lnpolarity
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What I meant was that there are trust-assumptions on Lightning as well, but we still call it trustless
I don't
Also, this is just v1! Lots of room for improvement as always
Keep up the good work! I love to see software like this come out
Very cool ideas