0 sats \ 0 replies \ @joda OP 29 Jan \ on: WHY ARE YOU NOT JUMPING UP AND DOWN ABOUT SPIDERCHAIN?! bitcoin
Following up, Micah from InvalidateBlock created a critique video inside a subway station a while back. The first comment is a reply from Willem, which I'll post here for those who don't dig YT. Hopefully it makes sense out of context:
Hi Micah,
Thanks for the review, appreciate you taking the time to dig through this. The more eyes we have on the design, the more we can improve.
Below some comments on open questions you posed and some clarifications.
In general, the paper is supposed to describe the general protocol design, not a specific implementation description.
(8:35) Stake s for our initial implementation will be fixed 3 BTC and multisig sizes of a 100. Dynamic stakes are very interesting and is a whole set of research with different tradeoffs introducing new sybil attack vectors. Will write a separate post on this one day.
(11:48) Catching and reporting of malicious attacks. Not specified in the design as there could be multiple ways to implement it. An example of how this could look like:
- Catching. A malicious participant send a signing request to all other participants to empty the multisig and divide equally between the participants. All the participants of course see this signing message.
- Reporting machanism. You can send an onchain a reporting message portraying the malicious signing request. All Orchestrators will then know who sent the malicious transaction request and who reported it.
The first one to report gets the slashing reward.
(13:06) Apologies on quadratically vs exponentially, is been fixed for the next version.
(14:33) This is incorrect, the size of the reward goes up quadratically. Not sure why you would divide this by the chance of you getting the reward as that’s not the decision you make in a specific instance. The action you will take will be to get the full reward. Therefore the single multisig game theory goes up quadratically.
(16:01) Exit of Orchestrators. As you pointed out the orchestrators will get replaced by random orchestrators ofcourse.
(20:40) The 50% is an example of multisigs that are generated in the future. The formula is in the paper, the number 50% is at a 2/3rd point to showcase that that the geometric distribution sits at 50% around 2/3rd.
(23:29) This is a probabilistic based approach and will become nearly impossible at a bigger stake size. Important to note the attacker has no control over this.
(24:10) FTX was fraud and Terra an algorithmic tulip bubble. I don’t think the comparison helps here.
Thanks again for the review, appreciate it.
Willem