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0 sats \ 3 replies \ @petertodd 23 Jan \ parent \ on: Peter Todd proposes RBFr bitdevs
The two attack vectors provided in comparison are both less potent in some ways
What do you mean by "less potent" here? And what specific attack vectors are you referring to?
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0 sats \ 2 replies \ @Murch 23 Jan
Affecting only listening nodes is less effective than affecting all nodes and broadcasting 205 kvB every few seconds at the cost of paying for 200 vB every few blocks is worse than broadcasting 404 kvB at a definitive price of paying for 50 vB.
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0 sats \ 1 reply \ @petertodd 23 Jan
Ok, so your comment was based on the assumption that the cycling problem isn't fixed.
If it is fixed, do you have further objections?
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0 sats \ 0 replies \ @Murch 25 Jan
You're departing from how we've been treating unconfirmed transactions so far. While discounting the tail of the mempool for top transactions intuitively makes plausible, instead of treating every transaction at its face value, that generally introduces new potential attack vectors. I'd like to see a more substantial exploration of that before I'd be convinced that's not a problem
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