"Since a typical anchor-output using Lightning channel takes 2x more block space, a large miner could easily offer out-of-band fee payments at, say, a 25% discount, giving them a substantial 25% premium over their smaller competitors. Given that mining pool fees are highly competitive, on the order of 1% or 2%, being able to earn a 25% premium over your competitors is an enormous advantage. With Lightning, offering this as a service in an automated, convenient, way would be quite easy to implement.”

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time the potential impact of fee-bumping techniques on miner competitiveness has been raised as a limitation of V3 policy format (even if I did raised doubts on the full anti-pinning efficiency, as we as a community don’t understand enough pinning attacks in my opinion).

Fee-bumping techniques comparison have been done in the past (before V3 policy): https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-May/019031.html

Zooming out, I think this discussion comes still as an aftermath of the conversation of last year on the design philosophy of policy changes in the context of full-rbf, where we never yield practical design goals that transaction-relay or mempool policy should ideally respect (e.g miner decentralization equilibrium, liquidity efficiency asymmetry among use-cases, L2s security risks): https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-May/019031.html