152 sats \ 1 reply \ @Ribbit 9 Nov 2023 \ parent \ on: Some thoughts on the game theory that results from btc wealth bitcoin
As long as the equilibrium of true stickers is enough to dissuade thieves, it might be short sighted to think of false stickers as free loaders in the classical game theory and political economy sense of parasites. It's more akin to free advertising. Like fake Luis Vuitton, the balance is in prosecuting enough fakes and leaving enough to advertise they
Ultimately A bitcoin community, or Network State as Balaji likes to call it, with passports, land rights and political representation is the solution.
So on one hand, El Salvador IS Max's security mechanism, an entire country with emergent security, on the other this security is not part of his personal signal but definitely his message as lately he is saying there will be line ups at airports heading there.
The sovereign individual book, predicted countries catering to digital asset holders.
As long as the equilibrium of true stickers is enough to dissuade thieves, it might be short sighted to think of false stickers as free loaders in the classical game theory and political economy sense of parasites. It's more akin to free advertising. Like fake Luis Vuitton, the balance is in prosecuting enough fakes and leaving enough to advertise[.]
While true in theory, I don't it plays out this way in practice, mainly because the asymmetry in the security example is so vast (fake sticker = $1 one time payment, real sticker from paying for the service = $100 month) which means that the likely outcome is that fake >> real; which means that, empirically, the sticker will have virtually no signaling value in practice, and not dissuade thieves at all. It wouldn't even be good advertising, since getting the security service would provide no deterrence, and your brand would in short order become synonymous for 'waste of money'.
The handbag case is quite different, mainly because thieves are not testing the validity of your handbag at great consequence to your health and safety. The signaling value of selective enforcement that you describe seems about right, though.
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