Pools exist because individual miners face both variance and latency disadvantages, and large pools mitigate both. Any solution that reduces latency without addressing variance might alter the shape of centralization but not eliminate it.
FIBRE and similar relay networks make it possible for smaller miners to compete on block propagation speed, which is a meaningful improvement in operational efficiency. However this introduces another centralized entity or group structure that miners rely on. The centralization pressure simply shifts from mining pools to relays. The moment a relay service becomes dominant in the network its operators gain influence similar to large pool operators because they can selectively delay or prioritize block announcements.
From a security standpoint this is not trivial. Reduced latency is valuable because it increases the effective hash power of a participant. If a relay controls who gets that advantage it becomes a gating mechanism for competitiveness. This means trust in the relay operator is unavoidable just as trust in a pool operator is unavoidable.
Pools exist because individual miners face both variance and latency disadvantages, and large pools mitigate both. Any solution that reduces latency without addressing variance might alter the shape of centralization but not eliminate it.
FIBRE and similar relay networks make it possible for smaller miners to compete on block propagation speed, which is a meaningful improvement in operational efficiency. However this introduces another centralized entity or group structure that miners rely on. The centralization pressure simply shifts from mining pools to relays. The moment a relay service becomes dominant in the network its operators gain influence similar to large pool operators because they can selectively delay or prioritize block announcements.
From a security standpoint this is not trivial. Reduced latency is valuable because it increases the effective hash power of a participant. If a relay controls who gets that advantage it becomes a gating mechanism for competitiveness. This means trust in the relay operator is unavoidable just as trust in a pool operator is unavoidable.