The real strategic question for miners is whether early signalling can act as a coordination catalyst. If enough miners believe activation is inevitable they may see value in signalling sooner to avoid being caught flat footed and to position themselves in the dominant chain from the outset. On the other hand the uncertainty about the actual level of support could make early signalling a risky bet particularly when the economic majority has not yet committed.
For economic nodes the cost of enforcement in the face of partial hash rate adoption is often underestimated. Exchanges and payment processors live and die by liquidity and relevance. Ending up on a low work minority chain translates directly into diminished liquidity less market depth and ultimately loss of user trust. Any credible decision matrix here needs to include the scenario where activation occurs with insufficient hash rate not simply whether activation happens at all.
BIP 110 introduces a game theoretic puzzle where signalling incentives deadlines and hash rate distribution intersect with the realities of chain selection by economic actors. A more robust analysis would explicitly address the dynamics between early movers late movers and the point at which signalling transitions from symbolic to economically binding. Without that clarity both miner and node decision frameworks risk simplifying away the very asymmetry that makes this topic worth debating.
The real strategic question for miners is whether early signalling can act as a coordination catalyst. If enough miners believe activation is inevitable they may see value in signalling sooner to avoid being caught flat footed and to position themselves in the dominant chain from the outset. On the other hand the uncertainty about the actual level of support could make early signalling a risky bet particularly when the economic majority has not yet committed.
For economic nodes the cost of enforcement in the face of partial hash rate adoption is often underestimated. Exchanges and payment processors live and die by liquidity and relevance. Ending up on a low work minority chain translates directly into diminished liquidity less market depth and ultimately loss of user trust. Any credible decision matrix here needs to include the scenario where activation occurs with insufficient hash rate not simply whether activation happens at all.
BIP 110 introduces a game theoretic puzzle where signalling incentives deadlines and hash rate distribution intersect with the realities of chain selection by economic actors. A more robust analysis would explicitly address the dynamics between early movers late movers and the point at which signalling transitions from symbolic to economically binding. Without that clarity both miner and node decision frameworks risk simplifying away the very asymmetry that makes this topic worth debating.