In the Suckistan example the issue is not trade per se but the institutional environment that determines who captures the gains. Without mechanisms that channel trade profits into broad-based development the comparative advantage story is incomplete. This is where political economy matters more than the abstract math. The incentives of elites the structure of property rights and the capacity of the state to invest in human capital will shape whether trade fuels prosperity or entrenches inequality.

It is worth noting that modern trade theory has evolved to acknowledge these frictions. Concepts like rent seeking resource curse and Dutch disease are attempts to map the real-world consequences when a country specializes in a narrow set of exports and the returns flow to a small segment of the population. That is also why development economists often emphasize institutional reform alongside trade liberalization. An open trading system can be a powerful engine for productivity gains but without parallel investments in governance and infrastructure the gains will either leak away or be captured by the few.

So when thinking about trade and comparative advantage it is useful to hold both truths together. The theoretical logic illuminates why trade can work even in asymmetric productivity settings. The political reality explains why in many countries it does not work as promised for the majority of citizens. The bridge between them is institutional quality which ultimately decides whether comparative advantage translates into shared advantage.