Thanks! I will address key points only for the sake of trying to not write an essay here. This does not mean I agree with everything else, but I guess it's useful to focus on some key things first so that perhaps I can relay why I'm not supporting your proposal in principle, and then later we can go over details if you still want to.

I think it helps a lot to explicitly declare by consensus that arbitrary data storage is not a supported use case.
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So in the future, if shitcoiners attempt similar attacks again, such activity will be immediately recognized as abuse and promptly filtered.

What you're proposing is to make a statement of sorts to all the people you perceive as evil, or, if you get the 55%, that a majority by a small margin would maybe perceive as evil, by temporarily blocking some data storage in consensus, but not all. I'll come back to the "some" point later and why I think that from a technical p.o.v. you will get completely destroyed by spammers post-activation.

I have many reasons for not supporting that on its own, no matter the technical details, per my point 5,6,7 above and my original point about official, which I now realize I have really done a poor job of explaining. But, your response creates a much worse problem because it treats Bitcoin Core as authoritative. Of course, there is ample evidence of this perception being alive out there, especially within anti-Core camps, but I fear that the assignment of that isn't reality and that it definitely isn't intended as such.

Note that I do agree with you that any form of data storage for the sake of data storage alone (and meta protocols in general, no matter if it is Omni, Counterparty, Ordinals, Runes, or otherwise) is abuse. I also think that there are a lot of people that feel that way yet aren't polarized that much that they would support your proposal. The question therefore is not so much whether there is abuse, but rather whether the sacrifices you propose are worth the gains.

Official?Official?

Bitcoin Core is not official; nothing in Bitcoin is, not since Amir and other freedom maxis challenged that early on. Additionally, post-Gavin, Bitcoin Core maintainers have removed all authoritative elements first, and then, recently, current maintainers made themselves so unpopular by redefining the Github repo "rules" towards a workplace-safety centric design, that it has lost all value other than the raw merit of reviews that do not get censored. This means that it is a reference client only now, but only because it still sees more review than any other node software despite some (still relatively light) moderation.

Of course, going from defacto standard software to mere reference client is a gradual transition, and the most powerful option that always exists for a protocol would ideally be adopted while the mindset adapts: the option of doing nothing. This is extremely important and I feel that across the whole of the debate, this option is insufficiently valued. Everyone lets themselves be stressed into taking action and this is detrimental to Bitcoin, because it decreases stability. The most important thing that Bitcoin offers is a very stable core consensus protocol. This also aligns with what you're saying about why other blockchains are a complete disaster when it comes to money-ness, though I think that there aren't that many that actually even remotely try to be money.

The root issueThe root issue

The recent change in Core v30 to remove the datacarrier size limit in policy does run counter to this. It would have been better to not change it, and pressure of a group like Citrea should in my opinion never impact a single line of code in the reference client. If it were me, I'd just tell them no, but it isn't me, so we are where we are. If your fork succeeds and people end up left behind, then it would strengthen the perception that Bitcoin is fragile though; that's also not a good outcome.

Your assertion

Core 30 sends a message that inscriptions are an officially sanctioned use of Bitcoin

is fundamentally mistaken. No one - not Core, not Luke, not you, not me and most importantly, not even the majority - currently has the authority to sanction anything on Bitcoin, other than the blocks they mine. This is why stackers here call you a censor, because you're assuming that because some perceived majority, by you but not by me, believes that there is a democratic authority in Bitcoin consensus, but this is not what Bitcoin has ever been. Consensus rules have always been extremely permissive and this is why I fundamentally disagree with your proposal: you're proposing to change Bitcoin's design philosophy because there is no consensus on how to handle the perceived problem. And because there is no consensus, the implementation is moving the goalposts on what consensus is: where we've had over a decade of 95% activation threshold, you're redefining this in 2 ways, and I read your reactions for this to be because you already know that there is not going to be full consensus:

1. You define a 55% threshold and you amended the standard for deployments to make that possible.
2. You force the fork regardless of reaching consensus even when measured against the weakened definition of consensus in tandem.

This means that you propose to reduce consensus instead of building it. I can't help but feel that this can turn into authoritarian action by either a subset of current miner consensus, or by an undefined quantity of economic nodes, and that would imho be awful.

But it's temporary, so it's fine? I am of the opinion that it cannot be temporary if the duration is a whole year.

Temporary?Temporary?

BIP-110 is not a recurring softfork, so this comment is not applicable. It is active for one year, and then it expires, unless the Bitcoin community fails to come up with a suitable permanent solution, in which case we could opt to extend it.

If nothing is solved permanently after a year-long restriction then I expect that out of spite, Bitcoin will be flooded with spam by those that have been doing it in the past. We've seen some pressure already being directed towards Core from Ordinals people to not adopt filters. If however you want a suitable permanent solution to your perceived problem to occur, then you need to build consensus. You seem to recognize this too, but you're really doing the opposite by weakening deployment requirements, so your proposal is not enabling this: your proposal, if it would actually do the whole job and is activated, would de-escalate the perceived problem and it will become less urgent to fix it permanently.

You also cannot just "extend" it. It's another softfork to do so because that's how consensus changes work - after all, you've hardcoded the expiration - because every client/miner would need to once more confirm they are up for another year: it would need to be signaled for readiness once more, which costs time and effort of the entire network.

After a year however there could be multiple protocol enhancement proposals wanting activation and they will want inclusion. But the only way you're going to get inclusion is by introducing all the code for that enhancement into consensus to support their fork and integrating it into there. This means that whomever gatekeeps the activation of the followup year, also gatekeeps which proposals can go through. Activations are gatekept because a versionbit must declare a specific behavior (after bit lock-in which iirc we don't do anymore since moving away from ISM), so you cannot run variant activations under the same bit and we may see competing proposals rather than parallel activation.

The only scenario that I see where this will create urgency is if spam is gone, then there is no extension, spam comes back, and then there is increased urgency, but it will be of our own making. However, because there will be reduced pressure in the meantime, this means that the solution will have to be proposed under artificial pressure. Pressure is a massive risk, but I don't think it will go like that with your current proposal.

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