Let’s WarGame what Xi Jinping and his senior advisory circle in Beijing are likely thinking after the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro. With Chinese diplomats caught in the chaos during meetings in Caracas this episode lands uncomfortably close to home for the PRC. Proximity matters. It turns what might have been a distant geopolitical maneuver into something operational and personal.
I’m approaching this assessment deliberately structured around first, second, and third order effects. I’m also staying in the higher probability lanes, pessimistic and neutral rather than drifting into cinematic edge cases. The scope is intentionally broad involving macroeconomics, geopolitics with a deep look at BRICS and de dollarization, China’s direct investments in Venezuela including critical minerals, and the wider South American chessboard. This is the kind of episode that doesn’t explode markets overnight, but quietly reshapes great power competition.
Beijing’s Initial Read
From Beijing’s vantage point, this U.S. operation reads as hegemonic overreach familiar in style, but more consequential in a multipolar world. Xi’s inner circle, spanning diplomats, defense planners, economists, intelligence officials, and Latin America specialists, would see this as a direct challenge to China’s energy security, loan recovery, and influence across the Global South.
Inside the system, the debate is predictable. Hawks argue this proves Washington is still willing to dismantle rival footholds by force. Doves warn that escalation risks economic blowback at a moment when China’s growth is already slowing. The shared instinct, however, is consistent…project stability and non interference publicly, while quietly reassessing exposure and leverage. The real wildcard sits with BRICS, where Venezuela has functioned as a node in non dollar oil trade.
First Order Effects And Immediate Disruptions
The first impact is uncertainty. Chinese assets in Venezuela are instantly repriced for political risk. Oil supply reliability is questioned. Diplomatic assumptions about red lines and escalation thresholds are shaken. Even in a neutral outcome, contracts, repayments, and energy flows become less predictable overnight.
This is about friction suddenly appearing where planners assumed continuity.
Second Order Effects And Systemic Ripples
Those shocks don’t stay contained. Higher oil risk feeds into China’s import bill and raises hedging costs. Regional partners begin to hedge their own exposure, recalibrating how closely they align with Beijing. BRICS coordination becomes more fragile as sanctioned state workarounds grow costlier and less reliable. Belt and Road projects in the region start to feel heavier and more exposed rather than stabilizing anchors.
The system absorbs the shock, but at a higher ongoing cost.
Third Order Effects And Strategic Shifts
Over time, this feeds into deeper structural questions. Does China double down on self reliance at higher cost and lower efficiency? Does de dollarization slow, giving the dollar system a longer runway than Beijing anticipated? Does renewed U.S. willingness to act decisively in the hemisphere alter how neutral states price alignment?
None of these answers resolve immediately. They show up quietly in behavior, capital flows, and diplomatic caution.
Macroeconomic Exposure With Oil, Debt, and Growth
China’s exposure to Venezuela is tangible. It has relied on discounted oil flows and has tens of billions tied up in loans and infrastructure, much of it oil backed. In a pessimistic scenario, chaos halts exports and a U.S. aligned regime defaults. First order effects hit China’s import bill by tens of billions annually. Second order effects force diversification to more expensive supply, straining foreign exchange reserves. Third order effects weaken China’s green tech competitiveness and slow growth.
In a neutral scenario, partial resumption brings uneven supply, higher hedging costs, and pressure to reroute Belt and Road supply chains. Resilience improves, but debt loads rise and returns fall. Beijing’s response remains restrained with statements calling for stability, quiet diversification, and avoidance of headline retaliation.
Geopolitical Fallout With BRICS and the Dollar Question
Geopolitically, the ripple effects widen. A flipped Venezuela weakens China’s foothold in the hemisphere and forces countries like Brazil and Colombia to hedge more aggressively. Russia remains rhetorically aligned, but stretched.
The deeper issue is de dollarization. Venezuela helped pioneer oil trade outside the dollar. Regime change threatens that plumbing. In a pessimistic path, BRICS cohesion fractures and dollar dominance persists longer. In a neutral path, progress continues, but years slower than planned. China responds with UN condemnation, coordinated messaging with Russia, selective financial support, and accelerated work on parallel systems like CIPS fully aware each step invites counter-pressure.
Investment Risk With Oil, Infrastructure, and Critical Minerals
China’s exposure spans oil fields, infrastructure, mining, and telecom. The mining dimension is smaller than oil, but strategically vital with rare earths, coltan, nickel, copper, and gold tied to advanced manufacturing and defense. In a pessimistic case, expropriation and disruption trigger write downs, price spikes, and regional confidence shocks that dent Belt and Road credibility. In a neutral case, back channel bargaining preserves partial access, but with delays and higher costs.
China evacuates personnel, monitors assets, invokes force majeure, diversifies sourcing, and avoids military signaling. This theater simply isn’t worth overt escalation.
Regional Contagion In South America Beyond Venezuela
Beyond Venezuela, the concern is contagion. China’s footprint across South America is extensive. In a pessimistic scenario, political dominoes fall, tech bans spread, and U.S. influence rebounds. In a neutral scenario, the shock is contained, but hedging intensifies everywhere. Beijing responds with aid, intelligence monitoring, and influence operations rather than direct intervention.
My View
In the end, Beijing plays the long game. Restraint now, optionality later. This episode forces recalibration. It reinforces a reality China already understands intellectually but now feels operationally because de dollarization and Global South influence are not abstract trends, they’re contested terrain.
Whether this fractures BRICS momentum or hardens it will matter for years. Watch behavior more than statements.
My view:
Xi was publicly embarrassed and likely politically harmed within the CCP party. I don't mean that they are going to throw him out, only that asian culture is very big on "face" and he lost it here.
China looked like amateur hour "babbys first cross hemispheric outpost".
The multi-year effort to create an ally in western hemisphere unraveled in 45 mins, with Maduro being perp-walked in chains.
In contrast to the above, I'm actually surprised Trump has been as quiet as he's been on the "china situation" vis a via Venezuela. I think the only rational explanation for the almost super level of decorum shown by Trump here is that he recognizes how exposed Xi is, thus anything he says will rub salt in the wounds thus he is trying to offer Xi a modicum of "face".