Most people will argue this as foreign policy: strong vs weak, regime change, national interest. The more interesting part is the permission structure: a legal move that treats “courts can’t enforce this treaty” as "the Executive isn’t bound by it.”

Does calling a treaty provision “non-self-executing” (not privately enforceable in court) mean the President can disregard it as domestic law?

Every cross-border action isn't illegal, and international law isn't always judicially enforceable in U.S. courts, but “not privately enforceable” ≠ “not binding on the President.”

A Just Security essay describes a 1989 OLC memo (signed by Bill Barr) reportedly invoked in a Maduro forcible-abduction context. The memo’s key leap is basically: Article 2(4) is “non-self-executing” → therefore it’s not domestic law binding the Executive.
https://www.justsecurity.org/127962/maduro-capture-operation-and-presidents-duty-to-faithfully-execute-un-charter/

Why that’s a big deal:
• It conflates “not a rule for courts” with “not binding on the political branches.”
• It creates a reusable “no-oversight” playbook: if courts can’t enforce it, the Executive treats it as optional.
• DOJ practice (and Congress) has repeatedly treated treaties as binding law even when they don’t create privately enforceable rights.

If we want accountable use of force, the question isn’t ‘hawk or dove.’ It’s whether the Executive is using legal theories to delete constraints.

What evidence would justify the jump from “non-self-executing” to “not binding on the President”, and what’s the limiting principle that prevents that jump from becoming a standing blank check?