Sowell’s argument about the Great Depression focuses less on the 1929 crash itself and more on the policy error that followed. The market break hurt confidence, but the economy wasn’t yet in free fall, unemployment was uneven but improving into mid 1930. The real turning point was Smoot-Hawley, when Washington imposed sweeping tariffs to protect jobs, ignoring warnings from more than 1,000 economists that retaliation would gut trade. That warning proved right. Global trade collapsed, retaliation spread quickly, and unemployment surged into double digits within months, staying there for the entire 1930s. In Sowell’s view, the depression wasn’t unavoidable, it was extended and deepened by policy choices.

That’s why today’s tariff escalation deserves more attention than it gets. Modern reciprocal tariffs, Section 232 actions, and tit for tat responses across China, Europe, Canada, Mexico, and others rhyme uncomfortably with that period. Once trade shifts from being a pressure release to a blunt weapon, the damage compounds where supply chains fracture, exporters suffer, prices skew, and already weak sectors deteriorate further. The historical lesson is that broad, retaliatory protectionism has a habit of turning manageable slowdowns into long, grinding economic slogs.