5483 sats \ 9 replies \ @benthecarman 29 Jan 2023 \ on: Answering Objections to Drivechain bitcoin
The most important thing you miss in 3 is that this totally destroys bitcoin's incentive model. With drivechains miners no longer have the incentive to mine the next block, there is a greater incentive to mine steal from drivechains.
Imo because of this, drivechain is one of the worst proposals ever to come to bitcoin.
You're telling me that there will be a 51% mining cartel attack that will last for multiple months without individual miners moving to other pools and that it will be aggressively reorging out any block that doesn't vote along with them -- but without Drivechain everything would be ok in Bitcoin land?
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With drivechains miners no longer have the incentive to mine the next block, there is a greater incentive to mine steal from drivechains.
I think they can only take the drivechain funds by mining a block containing a transaction that moves those funds into their own pockets. So they still have to mine the next block. Do you mean they have no incentive to mine the next sidechain block?
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So they still have to mine the next block
Not necessarily, they will likely be reorging out blocks that stop them from stealing. It just creates a greater incentive for 51% attacks
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they will likely be reorging out blocks that stop them from stealing
Can you reorg without extending the chain? I don't think so, the reorged chain has to be longer than the previous one or nodes will reject the reorg. So they still have to extend the chain in order to steal. I think I must be misunderstanding you.
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if you're attempting a reorg you aren't mining on the latest block, you are mining on a previous block to attempt to remove the latest block.
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I think I see what you mean now, by "mine the next block" I think you mean "build on top of whichever block was most recently mined prior to the reorg," whereas when I say "mine the next block" I mean "increase the number of blocks in the blockchain, regardless of the contents of your blocks."
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Assuming I understand you properly now, I think that if a set of miners tries to steal from a drivechain, and another set tries to stop them, that is an example of contention. Bitcoin's censorship resistance relies on its ability to work amidst contention. If it can't operate in a situation where one group tries to censor another group's blocks, then it is not fit for purpose, because that is part of the real world bitcoin is designed for.
What I think should happen in that case is this: the set of miners with 51% hashrate will win by slowly extending the chain farther than the other set of miners. The other set of miners will have to capitulate because at some point the cost of performing their attack exceeds the reward. The moment that happens, it proves that bitcoin's method of working through reorgs works. If it doesn't happen, and we just get constant reorgs over and over, that proves that bitcoin's method of working through reorgs has a problem that must be fixed.
Either way, I don't think drivechain creates this problem, rather it helps us prepare for it ahead of time, because if the real world's economies adopt bitcoin, such contentions are inevitable, and I for one would like to know that bitcoin can handle them.
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this is just generally incorrect.
PoW is not a method to achieve consensus under a different set of conflicting incentives. It is not a "method of working through reorgs".
It explicitly sets out to make it more profitable to mine on top of the next block according to a discrete incentive model. If reorgs occur then this incentive model is explicitly broken and the system is proven unstable ie. useless.
It's a careful balancing act and drivechains challenge this. "Preparing for this" is preparing for armageddon. You can be prepared all you want in the end the outcome is the same. We all die.
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The most important thing you miss in 3 is that this totally destroys bitcoin's incentive model.
Imo if drivechain sidechains become worth stealing from and somebody has the ability to do it and decides to do it then the value of the sidechain drops and the value of on-chain increases and the attack stops.
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