0 sats \ 4 replies \ @nerd2ninja 27 Jan 2023 \ parent \ on: Drivechain and the Side Effects of Bitcoin's Blocksize War bitcoin
You will never understand until you go out of your way to understand why the result of the block size wars turned out the way it did. Until you read and learn about the New York agreement.
write
preview
0 sats \ 3 replies \ @lightcoin 27 Jan 2023
I was there, literally: at the time, I worked for a company that signed the NYA... a somewhat awkward position to be in since I did not support the Segwit2x proposal, though to the leadership's credit they were also tolerant of my differing opinion. I rallied in support of the UASF and extensively documented the different ways the fork could go. Suffice to say, I understand :)
So, with the bona fides and qualifications out of the way, are you willing answer my question?
reply
0 sats \ 2 replies \ @nerd2ninja 27 Jan 2023
Then I need to restate myself.
  1. I do not believe all miners will contribute to sidechains a. Not every block, and I don't think even most blocks, will contain the W^1 spending condition alteration needed to spend out of a sidechain b. This means that less than 51% of the hashpower is needed to denial of service attack a sidechain
  2. Financial threat a. Users threaten miners with financial turmoil b. Drivechain means miners can financially threaten users by denying the ability to spend out of a sidechain. How? See point 1.
  3. Financial enablement a. A large sidechain userbase needs access to their funds. In order to do so, they enable miners who financially threatened them, by using the chain "that works". This creates a feedback loop wherein the economic majority is in the interest of the miners and what the users want, they can only get by enabling the miners. b. This is all made possible by point 1.
reply
0 sats \ 1 reply \ @lightcoin 27 Jan 2023
  1. I do not believe all miners will contribute to sidechains a. Not every block, and I don't think even most blocks, will contain the W^1 spending condition alteration needed to spend out of a sidechain
Conjecture, but let's roll with it for the sake of argument, because it is a possible scenario to consider.
b. Drivechain means miners can financially threaten users by denying the ability to spend out of a sidechain. How?
This seems like a MAD (mutually assured destruction) scenario to me: miners hit users in their pocketbooks, but users can also hit the miners back. Sure miners can mess with drivechain users but if they do that, they risk destroying confidence in the whole drivechain concept, which will cost them revenues not just on the chain they are DoSing but also on all other drivechains as users flee those chains scared that they might be DoSed next. And if mainchain users hear about bitcoin miners attacking a drivechain, they might begin to worry if the mainchain is next on the chopping block, causing an attrition of mainchain users as well. Sounds like a lot of risk to these attacking miners for... what gains exactly?
a. A large sidechain userbase needs access to their funds. In order to do so, they enable miners who financially threatened them, by using the chain "that works". This creates a feedback loop wherein the economic majority is in the interest of the miners and what the users want, they can only get by enabling the miners.
Having trouble parsing this part, could you rephrase or clarify? Will point out specific parts that don't make sense to me:
enable miners who financially threatened them, by using the chain "that works"
what chain are you referring to? what exactly do you mean by "enable"?
This creates a feedback loop wherein the economic majority is in the interest of the miners and what the users want, they can only get by enabling the miners
What exactly do you mean by "the economic majority is in the interest of the miners"? How exactly does the "feedback loop" you're referring to work?
reply
0 sats \ 0 replies \ @nerd2ninja 31 Jan 2023
Remember when LND broke? Twice? Some people just want to see things break.
The chain I'm reffering to is the forked chain. Remember this scenario is about miner power vs user power to push a consensus change.
The economic majority. The people who are buying bitcoin (which will make it more valuable) will dump coins from the obviously broken chain which is now its own token and technically can't be called bitcoin anymore. This drives hash power.
Enable as in to allow or empower someone to do something. Especially something they couldn't do without your help
reply