pull down to refresh
0 sats \ 0 replies \ @Row 11h \ parent \ on: Past transactions that violate BIP 444 Reduce Data Temporary Soft Fork rules bitcoin
Do I sound zealous enough?
People like to handwave off these concerns because the thing is open source, but that could well be part of a DoS attack of sorts, just as communists will set fire to keep people fighting fires rather than organizing resistance.
Couldn't agree more.
I was talking about my concerns with Rust with a couple friends and they told me "Why don't you post it on stacker.news?", so I did.
I've worked on a few mobile game companies here and there.
My own stuff are mostly entries for game jams:
https://rowdaboat.itch.io
Then there's my own engine in which I've done demoscene stuff:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FuqRFe3w_nE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHt7dqqidyw
Yep, the worst part is that this poor uneducated retard tries to be smug while just falling into the trap of Lunduke's sensationalism, about a very old, very rational, very plausible, very dangerous, and very well known attack that was presented [and executed by a single person], a Turing Award winner.
These are the same people that then yap "don't trust verify", but don't have the shittiest idea of [what] to verify.
I wouldn't trust anything that guy is saying. As far as I know there is a bootstrap for Rust through mrustc, gcc, and finally stage0. Bitcoin Core takes a lot of in pride in only shipping a binary that is built from a fully transparently bootstrapped toolchain using a similar chain of tools.
Lunduke exagerates everything, but that's besides the point, his argument is one logical, not a sensationalist one. Notice that this is not about Core, but the things we run algonside Core, such as LDK, LNDK, Ord, or, why not... even cargo-binutils.
I'm familiar with it. It would be kind of solved with a second Rust compiler. Only if you use it.
That's the point, having a second compiler would allow you as an auditor to perform the cross-check.
In the current state, you can't, and have to resort to auditing every single binary.
What options does the Bitcoin community have? Participate in their development process. Don't trust, verify.
Check Ken Thompson's "Reflection on Trusting Trust".
Auditories are out of the question, the problem is precisely that since the compiler is self-hosted, such attack is not easily auditable, the scheme can hide malicious code without requiring to publish a change in the source, you'd have to audit each and every binary release of the compiler.
It would be kind of solved with a second Rust compiler.
GENESIS