Does this actually pose a threat to LN authentication e.g. here on SN? When you repeatedly sign login authentication messages with your node privkey and hand them to SN, aren't you opening up this attack vector?

Despite others poo-poo'ing this work, I think it's 1) indeed novel but de rigeur cryptanalytic research, and 2) a reasonably well-written exposition of a well-known and long-theorized cryptanalytic weakness of ECDSA actually being exploited adversarially "in the wild", with real economic consequences. That's pretty cool!

However, framing it as a novel attack is somewhat risible given that the actual novel part, the "polynonce attack", was irrelevant to finding those 773 private keys (they all used repeated nonces and so could each have been broken much more easily). And "773 wallets broken" should instead be "exposing 773 real-world cryptanalytic breaks of Bitcoin security due to faulty Bitcoin wallets"

For someone who knows nothing about EC cryptography, it would be illuminating and useful to learn the biggest flaw in ECDSA: how utterly crucial it is to use a truly random nonce for each and every signature, and if your wallet doesn't, someone's gonna snatch yo' coins. But the hyped-up headline and misleading framing makes it sound like typical clickbait academic journalism crap.