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The Market of Death Bets: Realignment of Power and Responsibility
Responding to requests, the following text answers the three questions proposed by Alan Schramm in relation to MAM - Death Betting Markets. Without defense or moral judgment, only possible technical solutions to the three issues raised are discussed: the escrow, the identifier and the oracle.
Introduction After the collapse of FTX, it is undeniable that powerful global groups have their stakes and representatives within the Bitcoin ecosystem, sometimes collaborating and sometimes conflicting. This was evident in the "war of wars" battle.
The topic has been previously discussed in a literature review within the same substack, covering the legality of life insurances taken out on politicians' deaths, the exact analogy of death bets with insurance, the plausibility of legal use, and the historical publications on capture/assassination markets.
The Market of Death Bets: A New Approach The concept of the Market of Death Bets (MAM) has garnered increasing public interest, and this article aims to delve into the main aspects of this controversial market. The MAM proposes a unique approach to realigning power and responsibility by allowing victims to invest small amounts in betting on the demise of their oppressors.
The Problem of Collective Action One of the challenges in addressing corruption lies in the separation of control and ownership. In modern governments, this issue has reached its peak, with elected officials and even unelected bureaucrats causing immense harm to millions or even billions of people with impunity.
The Market of Death Bets could potentially serve as a means to address this issue. By enabling victims to invest small amounts in betting on the death of their oppressors, it offers a solution to Olson's "problem of collective action.
" This problem explains why criminals tend to capture governments administratively, benefiting from centralized gains while diffusing losses. The MAM could also serve to deter crimes, prevent non-criminal abhorrent behavior, and curb corruption through administrative capture by increasing the risk of becoming a target of significant death bets.
How the Market of Death Bets Would Function In essence, the MAM would provide a platform, either centralized by a reputable sovereign entity or running on a sidechain/federation through smart contracts. This platform would enable victims to identify their oppressors and place bets on their demise using a pseudo-anonymous mechanism.
Other participants, such as hired killers (sicarios), regular gamblers seeking alternatives to state-run lotteries, and even the targets themselves, could also invest in the bets.
The Potential Prizes and Mechanisms The potential prizes for successful bets in the MAM could be staggering. For example, if one million people bet an average of $1000 on the day a dictator would die, a total of $1 billion could be pseudo-anonymously collected for the correct prediction.
With such vast sums at stake, even relatives and close associates might be willing to ensure the target's death on the specified day, especially if the destination and recipient of the payment remain undisclosed.
The article also discusses gamification mechanisms to improve efficiency in the betting process. This includes exclusive bets for each day to avoid prize division, pseudonymous betting and payments, and increasing betting costs (perfect discrimination) to discourage frivolous bets.
Addressing Privacy and Oracles One of the critical challenges in the MAM is maintaining privacy for bettors and especially for the winner. Several solutions can be explored, depending on the platform used. For on-chain transactions, privacy could be guaranteed through private acquisition of funds and payouts to the winning addresses.
Alternatively, other layers, such as Liquid's confidential transactions, Lightning Network, and coinjoin or coinsawps, offer existing solutions for enhanced privacy.
Another critical aspect is the issue of decentralized oracles. The article proposes a solution that allows any participant to claim the end of a bet or indicate their agreement or disagreement with the specified date of the event.
The time for payment would be proportional to the difference between those who agreed and those who disagreed with the outcome. This incentivizes the winner to provide public evidence of the event, as more significant evidence collection would extend the payout period.
Conclusion The Market of Death Bets, with its potential to realign responsibility and power, opens up new possibilities in addressing corruption and holding accountable those in positions of authority.
Privacy concerns and decentralized oracles can be addressed through various technical solutions. Although this article has explored the concept and potential of the MAM, further considerations, such as platform remuneration and the handling of unclaimed resources, need more in-depth analysis.
FAQs 1: Is the Market of Death Bets legal?
The legality of the Market of Death Bets varies depending on the jurisdiction. While some countries may consider it illegal, others might view it as a form of free expression or gambling. This raises complex legal and ethical questions that require careful examination.
2: How would the Market of Death Bets affect society?
The impact of the MAM on society is highly speculative. While some argue that it could deter corruption and promote accountability, others raise concerns about potential misuse and harm. A thorough societal impact assessment would be necessary before considering its implementation.
3: Can the Market of Death Bets be regulated?
Regulating the MAM would be a challenging task, given its pseudo-anonymous nature and potential cross-border implications. Any regulatory approach must strike a delicate balance between personal freedom and public safety.
4: What are the risks associated with the Market of Death Bets?
The risks are multifaceted and include potential misuse, incentivizing violence, and the ethical implications of betting on human life. These risks need to be carefully evaluated and mitigated before any practical implementation.
5: What alternatives exist to address corruption?
Numerous alternatives exist for addressing corruption, including strengthening legal frameworks, promoting transparency and accountability, and empowering civil society. These approaches should be explored alongside the potential benefits and risks of the Market of Death Bets.
Yes, this was conceptualized by the cypherpunk Jim Bell in the 90s essay Assassination Politics. Ben Bernanke still has an active hit out on him in BTC since 2010. None of that stuff works outside dystopian novels. It will only lead to more conflict, and more efficient corruption, like a drug war, where top guys are perpetually taken out, easily replaced, and long since conditioned to life within proximity of death.
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Can you share with us more content related to cypherpunk Jim Bell? I would love to read, learn and develop more about...
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JW Weatherman (not a fan) has a good interview with Jim Bell about this concept
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I'm watching the video, thanks brother
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I've thought about this concept for awhile as a thought experiment. I think there's also the "other side of the bet" that's interesting too. For instance, as a protection mechanism. If you're confident that you can protect yourself from an ever increasing death bet, you can take the other side and bring down the incentive for an assassination. Part of the "insurance" cost for hiring body guards too, because you have to keep them in check as well and not make it worth turning on you.
However, where I think this breaks down is how naive and irrational markets can be when "retail" enters the picture. You really wouldn't want a GME situation to happen to someone's life. Mobs are incredibly stupid and just want chaos and death.
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it would be something very 'like' a hedge, am I right?
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I desperately need to spend my sats on this! But where???
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Your comment is very good, taking advantage of the 'bets' do you guess how long for 'this to beborn'?
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