Continuing on the same hydrocarbon theme: #1458195 (Also, The Economist editors' puns today are ON POOOINT!)
For Americans of a certain age, and macroeconomists of all ages, the 1970s carry a lingering trauma. Then as now, petrol prices spiked after tumult in the Middle East. Inflation soared; growth slumped. Cars queued at parched petrol stations and the ugly word “stagflation” entered the vernacular.
If you read Albrecht's piece linked above, you know this isn't America's fate this time around, #hashtag shalegas revolution/drill-baby-drill.
"For all the historical rhymes, that era is not an ideal guide to the present day.""For all the historical rhymes, that era is not an ideal guide to the present day."
Windfall profits generated by energy firms in 2022 and 2023 helped cause another wave of investment in hydrocarbon production, which can now be put to use. America’s LNG export capacity, much of it in Texas and Louisiana, is a third larger than it was then and is set to grow by another 10% or so by the end of the year. Oil production has risen by half in the past decade.
This is the welfare/redistribution theme that matters:
The most profound intra-American redistribution will occur between the less affluent and the loaded. The lowest-earning fifth of Americans devote nearly twice as much of their spending to petrol and electricity as the top-earning fifth. Whereas the rich can absorb the shock, poorer Americans must cut back purchases of other things in order to fill up their cars and pay their power bills. The longer they do so, the bigger the hit to their welfare.
Funny conclusion:
The war’s clearest winners may well be neither America nor Iran, but an unlikely pairing of oil companies and congressional Democrats.
Curious what everyone thinks: can policy smooth these intra-American shocks, or is this just the modern energy reality?